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Abstract The efficient prediction of the behavior of
others requires the recognition of their actions and an
understanding of their action goals. In humans, this process
is fast and extremely robust, as demonstrated by classical
experiments showing that human observers reliably judge
causal relationships and attribute interactive social behav-
ior to strongly simplified stimuli consisting of simple
moving geometrical shapes. While psychophysical exper-
iments have identified critical visual features that deter-
mine the perception of causality and agency from such
stimuli, the underlying detailed neural mechanisms remain
largely unclear, and it is an open question why humans
developed this advanced visual capability at all. We cre-
ated pairs of naturalistic and abstract stimuli of hand
actions that were exactly matched in terms of their motion
parameters. We show that varying critical stimulus
parameters for both stimulus types leads to very similar
modulations of the perception of causality. However, the
additional form information about the hand shape and its
relationship with the object supports more fine-grained
distinctions for the naturalistic stimuli. Moreover, we show
that a physiologically plausible model for the recognition
of goal-directed hand actions reproduces the observed
dependencies of causality perception on critical stimulus
parameters. These results support the hypothesis that
selectivity for abstract action stimuli might emerge from
the same neural mechanisms that underlie the visual pro-
cessing of natural goal-directed action stimuli. Further-
more, the model proposes specific detailed neural circuits
underlying this visual function, which can be evaluated in
future experiments.
Introduction
The prediction of others’ behavior is a fundamental
requirement for human interaction. It requires the recog-
nition of the actions of others and an understanding of their
action goals. This behavior is extremely important for
survival and is accomplished quickly and robustly. Clas-
sical experiments demonstrate that human social interac-
tions and causal relationships related to actions can be
recognized with high reliability even from strongly
impoverished stimuli consisting of simple moving geo-
metrical shapes (Heider & Simmel, 1944; Michotte, 1946/
1963). An example is a stimulus display consisting only of
two moving disks, where one starts to move when the other
one stops to move in the same direction. This stimulus
induces the impression of causality (‘launching effect’), i.e.
participants perceive the movement of the second disk as
caused by the first. However, when the spatial or temporal
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relationship between the two disks is disturbed this percept
of causality can disappear (Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). The
attribution of causality and intentions to such simple
stimuli seems to be universal and consistent over different
cultures (Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Barrett, Todd, Miller, &
Blythe, 2005).
It was hypothesized by Michotte that the capability to
interpret such interactive movements might be innate and
dependent on specific mechanisms. Work in developmental
psychology shows that this capability is present already
early during development, before the age of 1 year (Leslie
& Keeble, 1987; Rochat, Morgan, & Carpenter, 1997; Saxe
& Carey, 2006), and that it is modifiable by learning and
experience (see Schlottmann, Ray, Mitchell, & Demetriou,
2006 for a discussion). Many of Michottes’ early findings
on perceptual causality were replicated by other research-
ers (Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000), and some work has
extended the study of the perception of abstract motion
stimuli to the study of inferences about intentions (e.g.
Dasser, Ulbaek, & Premack, 1989; Schlottmann & Shanks
1992; Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2009). Detailed psy-
chophysical studies showed that the perception of causality
in simple displays is critically dependent on the spatial and
temporal contingency of the moving discs, and specifically
on their direction and relative speed, in line with Michot-
tes’ original findings (Beasley, 1968; Bassili, 1976; Sch-
lottmann & Anderson, 1993; Dittrich & Lea, 1994; White
& Milne, 1997; Blythe, Todd, & Miller, 1999; Oakes &
Kannass, 1999; Schlottmann et al., 2006; Choi & Scholl,
2006).
Knowledge about the neural mechanisms that might
underlie the interpretation of such interactive motion dis-
plays is quite limited. Imaging studies have extensively
studied cortical areas involved in the interpretation of such
stimuli in terms of intentional actions, reporting selective
activation specifically in the posterior superior temporal
sulcus (pSTS) and the neighboring temporo-parietal junc-
tion (TPJ) (Frith & Frith, 1999; Castelli, Happe, Frith, &
Frith, 2000, Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Frith &
Frith, 2003; Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Saxe, Xiao,
Kovacs, Perrett, & Kanwisher, 2004; Schultz, Imamizu,
Kawato, & Frith, 2004; Brass, Schmitt, Spengler, &
Gergely, 2007; de Lange, Spronk, Willems, Toni, & Bek-
kering, 2008; Hamilton & Grafton, 2008; Jastorff, Cla-
vagnier, Gergely, & Orban, 2011). For stimuli involving
perceptual causality, selective activation in the intraparietal
sulcus and the inferior parietal lobule as well as the medial
frontal gyrus has been reported, in addition to the superior
temporal regions (Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Fonlupt,
2003; Fugelsang et al., 2005). A lesion study with split-
brain patients points to a lateralization of the associated
neural processes, the perception of launching events being
localized predominantly in the right hemisphere (Roser,
Fugelsang, Dunbar, Corballis, & Gazzaniga, 2005). These
temporal, parietal and frontal regions form a densely con-
nected network of areas known to be involved in the per-
ception of natural action stimuli (see e.g. Van Overwalle &
Baetens, 2009).
At the level of single cells in macaque cortex, a similar
interconnected network of areas has been shown to be
activated during action perception (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia,
2010; Nelissen et al., 2011). In particular, in the macaque
superior temporal sulcus neurons have been observed that
are selective to the observation of movements of the body
or body parts relative to objects in the surround (Perrett
et al., 1989; Jellema & Perrett, 2006; Barraclough, Keith,
Xiao, Oram, & Perrett, 2009). It seems possible that such
neurons are also involved in the representation of interac-
tive movements, potentially also for abstract stimuli. In
functional imaging studies it has been observed that cor-
tical regions involved in the observation of natural actions,
such as the superior temporal sulcus, and parietal and
premotor cortex, might also be recruited during the
observation and interpretation of highly abstract action
stimuli (Castelli et al., 2000; Martin & Weisberg, 2003;
Ohnishi et al., 2004; Schultz et al., 2004; Schubotz & von
Cramon, 2004; Reithler, van Mier, Peters, & Goebel, 2007;
Petroni, Baguear, & Della-Maggiore, 2010). However,
beyond a localization of potentially relevant cortical areas,
knowledge about detailed neural circuits underlying the
perception of causality from action stimuli is completely
lacking.
While there are no detailed neural theories about the
processing of causal interactions, a small amount of work
exists on possibly underlying computational mechanisms.
Blythe et al. (1999) demonstrated that a neural network
model based on simple visual cues, such as the relative
motion of the disks, reliably predicts participants’ judg-
ments about the intentionality of observed movements.
This study shows that performance in this apparently
highly cognitive task might be dependent on relatively
elementary visual features that characterize the interaction
between the moving elements. Another recent abstract
model based on cognitive schemata theory has been pro-
posed by Rips (2011). Other models have tried to account
for related phenomena by Bayesian inference and inverse
probabilistic planning (Baker et al., 2009). None of these
models makes a direct link to physiological mechanisms, or
even attempts to explain how the detection of causal events
could be accomplished based on real video stimuli.
Based on previous theoretical work on the encoding of
goal-directed hand movements (Fleischer, Casile, & Giese,
2009; Fleischer & Giese, 2010), we propose in this paper a
neurally inspired theory for the recognition of interactive
movements from abstract motion displays. This theory is
based on the hypothesis that the visual analysis of abstract
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motion displays can be explained by the neural mecha-
nisms that are normally responsible for the processing of
natural stimuli showing goal-directed movements, such as
hand actions. We claim that some of the observed phe-
nomenology for the perception of abstract movements can
be derived from such mechanisms, when it is additionally
assumed that the accuracy of form processing is reduced
during the processing of abstract motion stimuli.
In the following, we will provide arguments in support
of this hypothesis: (1) Exploiting a new set of video stimuli
that present the same goal-directed hand actions in a nat-
ural and in an abstract way, we show that ratings of natu-
ralness and the attribution of causality are very similar
between those two stimulus classes. Observed differences
indicate that the processing of abstract stimuli is less sen-
sitive to spatial manipulations of the stimulus than the
processing of naturalistic action stimuli. (2) We demon-
strate that variations of causality and naturalness ratings
with stimulus manipulations, which are known to affect the
perception of causality, can be qualitatively reproduced
with a physiologically inspired model for the recognition of
naturalistic goal-directed hand actions. The only manipu-
lation that was necessary to adapt this model for the pro-
cessing of abstract stimuli was a reduction of the tuning
accuracy.
Methods
Our psychophysical experiment compared ratings of
manipulated action stimuli in terms of their naturalness and
perceived causality. We used naturalistic stimuli of goal-
directed hand actions (grasping and pushing), where we
modified the spatial and temporal parameters of the hand
and object movement along dimensions that were known to
affect the perception of causality from simple displays.
These stimuli were generated by video manipulation from
two original movies in order to achieve precise control of
the spatial and temporal parameters, keeping the shapes of
effector and object exactly the same. In addition, we gen-
erated a set of abstract action stimuli that closely matched
the naturalistic displays in terms of their motion parame-
ters. The matched set of abstract action stimuli was derived
from the naturalistic stimuli by tracking the positions of the
hand and object and replacing them by two circular discs.
Similar methods were recently proposed for the generation
of abstract versions of intentional full-body movements
(McAleer & Pollick, 2008).
The model presented in this paper has been developed
originally in order to account for the properties of action-
selective single cells in monkey cortex. The available space
in this article permits only to lay out the major concepts
underlying the architecture of the neural model. With
respect to the technical details about the implementation,
the simulations of physiological data, and a more elaborate
evaluation of the computational performance of the model
with natural action videos we refer to previous publications
(Fleischer et al., 2009; Fleischer & Giese, 2010).
Participants
Eighteen volunteers from the University of Tu¨bingen with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision (12 male, 6 female;
age 21–41 years) participated in the psychophysical study.
All were naı¨ve with respect to the purpose of this experi-
ment and gave informed consent prior to testing. Partici-
pants received a financial compensation for taking part in
the experiment. The study was in accordance with the
declaration of Helsinki and approved by the ethics com-
mittee of the Eberhard-Karls-University Tu¨bingen.
Materials
Naturalistic video stimuli
Video stimuli of hand actions were recorded from a single
perspective (side view) using a custom video camera (Sony
PCR-5 Camcorder, 576 9 720 pixels, 25 Hz). Two types
of actions were recorded: (1) pushing a ball (diameter
8 cm) with the right hand, the hand moving from right to
left, and the ball continuing to move to the left side after
contact; and (2) grasping of the ball, lifting it, and dis-
placing it to the right side. The first stimulus is similar to
the classical ‘launching stimulus’ by Michotte (see Fig. 1a,
b). Hand movements started from a resting position at
approximately 40 cm distance to the right of the ball.
We generated a set of video stimuli by varying critical
parameters that were known from the literature to influence
the perception of causality from abstract stimuli. For this
purpose, we separated the hand and the object by seg-
menting them from the background using commercial
software (AdobeTM AfterEffects). The resulting video
streams were spatially resampled (500 9 1,000 pixels,
25 Hz) and recombined using custom-made software
(implemented in Matlab 7.6, The MathWorksTM). All
stimuli were generated by overlaying the images contain-
ing the acting hand on top of the images of the object in
order to generate normal occlusion patterns. The size of the
hand and the object in the final stimulus corresponded to
3.8, respectively, 1.7 visual angle. The whole action took
about 1,200 ms for grasping stimuli and 680 ms for
pushing stimuli. The overall stimulus area subtended about
18 by 33 of visual angle.
Novel artificial video stimuli were generated by
manipulating the distance between the hand and the object,
the point of contact, and their relative timing on each
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individual video frame. In the Shift condition we varied the
distance of hand and object by displacing the hand along
the horizontal axis (Fig. 2a). As a result, the hand did not
touch the object and rather appeared to mimic the action at
different distances from the object (50, 100, 150, 200, and
250 pixels). In the Contact point condition we rotated the
center of gravity (CoG) of the hand stimulus about the CoG
of the object clockwise by different angles (90, 45, 0,
-45, -90), where the distance between the two CoGs
was kept constant (Fig. 2b).
In a third set of conditions (Pause) the frame during
which the hand first touched the object was repeated
multiple times [resulting in presentation times of the initial
contact event of 40 (no repetition), 200, 400, 600, and
800 ms]. Longer pauses result in the perceptual impression
that hand and the object stop briefly in the middle of the
interaction (Fig. 3a). The final set of conditions (Time gap)
was created by introducing time delays with different
durations (0, 40, 120, 200, 280, 360 ms) between the
movement of the hand and the object. This causes the
impression that the object responds to the action of the
hand in a delayed fashion, somewhat like there was a
rubber band between the hand and the object (Fig. 3b).
Abstract stimuli
For the generation of abstract motion stimuli from the
naturalistic video stimuli, the hand and the object were
replaced by two circular discs with a diameter of 60 pixels
(2 of visual angle) using custom-made software (imple-
mented in Matlab 7.6, The MathWorksTM). The hand was
replaced by a green and the object by a blue disc, located at
the corresponding CoGs in the naturalistic stimulus
(Fig. 1c, d). The green disc was slightly shifted along the
A
B
C
D
Fig. 1 Illustration of the stimuli. a Naturalistic grasping stimulus, b naturalistic pushing stimulus, c abstract grasping stimulus, d abstract
pushing stimulus. Discs were placed at the centers of gravity of hand and object and corrected for correct tangential contact
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line connecting the CoGs of object and hand in order to
assure a tangential contact between the two discs at the
same time the hand first touched the object in the
corresponding naturalistic non-modified stimulus. The
absolute and relative locations as well as the motion pat-
terns of the disc stimuli thus matched as closely as possible
Fig. 2 Illustration of the spatial
manipulations of grasping and
pushing stimuli. Frames
generated from the original
frame where the hand first
touches the ball. a Grasping and
b pushing action including a
Shift manipulation, resulting in
interactions without contact
between hand and object.
c Grasping d and pushing action
with the Contact point
manipulation, where the hand
position was rotated by different
amounts about the ball, defining
incorrect contact points between
fingers and object
Fig. 3 Temporal manipulations. a Modified stimulus with Pause
manipulation. The contact frame is repeated (dashed line) for a
variable time interval ranging from 40 to 200 ms. b Stimulus with
Time gap. The movement of the ball in the video stream is delayed
against the movement of the hand by various delays from 0 to 360 ms.
For non-zero delay the hand moves back (dashed arrow) before the
ball starts to follow (solid arrow)
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those of their realistic counterparts. Examples of the
stimuli can be downloaded as supplementary material.
Procedure/experimental design
Participants rated all stimuli with respect to (1) their sim-
ilarity to normal hand–object interactions (Naturalness),
and (2) in how far they induced the impression that one
stimulus element caused the movement of the other
(Causality). The second task was chosen in accordance
with the classical rating tasks used in many previous
studies on causal interactions (Michotte, 1946/1963; Scholl
& Tremoulet, 2000). The participants sat in front of a
computer screen at a distance of approximately 50 cm.
Stimuli were presented on a Dell InspironTM TFT monitor
with a frame rate of 60 Hz. The video stimuli covered an
area of about 18 9 33 visual angle on the screen.
The whole experiment consisted of three phases. Writ-
ten instructions were given before each phase individually
to each subject, and participants were asked whether they
had understood the tasks. In each phase, pushing and
grasping stimuli were presented in random order. In the
first phase, the abstract versions of the original actions as
well as their most extreme manipulations were presented to
the participants in random order (12 stimuli in total). Par-
ticipants were first asked to rate their intuitive impression
whether the green ball made the blue ball move. The
purpose of this first phase was to assess the consistency of
the participants’ interpretations of the abstract stimuli,
before their judgments were biased by the knowledge of
the original natural action stimuli. Responses were given
by adjusting a slider on a scale from 0 (‘No, not at all’) to 1
(‘Yes, very much’) in steps with a size of 0.1. Next, par-
ticipants were asked to give a brief written explanation of
the reasons for their judgments. Participants were allowed
to watch the same stimulus multiple times, pressing a
repetition key.
In the second phase of the experiment, all artificial
stimuli (including the non-manipulated ones; 10 stimuli
with shifts, 8 stimuli with modified contact point, 8 con-
ditions with pauses, and 10 conditions with time gaps) were
presented in two subsequent blocks in random order. Par-
ticipants had to rate, first, to which degree the presented
stimulus corresponded to a normal hand–object interaction
(Naturalness). Second, they had to rate the strength of their
impression that the green disc made the blue one move
(Causality). Responses were again given by adjusting
sliders on a scales from 0 (‘No, not at all’) to 1 (‘Yes, very
much’) in steps with the size 0.1. In this phase, stimuli
were displayed only once. As we were interested in how far
the abstract stimuli were judged as similar to real movies of
grasping and pushing, we showed a single example of
natural grasping and pushing in the instruction of this
phase. In the third phase, participants were presented with
all naturalistic stimuli, 40 in total, in two blocks with
random order. The task was identical to the one in the
second phase described above.
Model architecture
The proposed model was originally developed to account for
electrophysiological data from action-selective neurons in
monkey cortex, addressing in particular the visual tuning
properties of neurons in the STS and of mirror neurons in
area F5. In contrast to other models for the mirror neuron
system in the literature that focus on the influence of motor
representations on action recognition (Oztop, Kawato, &
Arbib, 2006; Bonaiuto & Arbib, 2010; Tessitore, Prevete,
Catanzariti, & Tamburrini, 2010; Chersi, 2011), our model
focuses specifically on the visual processing mechanisms for
actions. The model is computationally powerful enough to
recognize goal-directed hand actions from real video stimuli.
Details about this work can be found in Fleischer et al.
(2009). We demonstrate here that the same neural architec-
ture can account for the perception of causality from abstract
action stimuli. The major modification of the model was that
we reduced the selectivity of the form-selective neurons in
the model for the abstract stimuli. A task-dependent modu-
lation, e.g. of the width or gain of tuning functions has been
observed regularly, for example, in the context of attentional
manipulations or perceptual learning (e.g. Treue & Maun-
sell, 2006; Kourtzi & Connor, 2011). An overview of the
model architecture is given in Fig. 4.
The model consists of three major modules: (A) A form
recognition hierarchy, modeling form-selective neurons in
the ventral visual stream including the primary visual
cortex, area V4, and IT, as well as form-selective neurons
in the dorsal stream of the monkey cortex including the
STS; (B) an affordance module that computes information
about the relationship between effector and object, i.e. the
matching of the hand and object shape and their relative
positions and speed. This module implements computa-
tional functions which are likely realized by neurons in
parietal cortex, such as the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) or
the anterior intraparietal area (AIP); (C) a third module that
models neural representations of goal-directed actions in
premotor and parietal cortex. The first level of this module
represents the action in a time-resolved manner, with
neurons that encode specific temporal phases (similar to
grip phases), while the second level represents actions
independent of their intrinsic time structure. The neurons
on this second level are active when a particular goal-
directed action (grasping or pushing) is perceived. Their
activity makes it possible to predict the behavioral results
from psychophysical experiments addressing the percep-
tion of causality.
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123
The first module (Fig. 4a), the form recognition hier-
archy, is a physiologically inspired model for the recog-
nition of shapes, following the principles of many other
established models for object recognition (e.g. Riesenhuber
& Poggio, 1999; Deco & Rolls, 2005). It mimics the
hierarchical structure of the ventral visual pathway, starting
from primary visual cortex to higher form-selective struc-
tures such as area IT or equivalent structures in the dorsal
stream. Simple cells in area V1 are modeled by Gabor
filters with different orientations and spatial resolution
levels. Complex cells are modeled by pooling of the out-
puts of simple cells with the same preferred orientation
within a limited spatial receptive field using maximum
operations. Mid-level shape detectors (shape fragment
detectors) are modeled by combining the responses from
the complex cells by radial basis functions. The selectivity
of these detectors was optimized by unsupervised learning
(using k-means clustering) from a training data set. These
pattern detectors learned to represent a characteristic dic-
tionary of mid-level form features, corresponding to parts
of objects or hands. Such features are likely represented in
area V4 and TEO of the monkey cortex (for related mod-
eling approaches for mid-level feature detectors cf. e.g.
Serre et al., 2007 or Ullman, 2007). The highest level of the
form recognition hierarchy is formed by model neurons
that are selective for the shape of the whole goal object and
the whole hand (object and hand shape detectors). These
neurons are also modeled by radial basis functions whose
selectivity is optimized by supervised learning (i.e. by
training on a set of naturalistic stimuli that the model is
B
C
A
Fig. 4 Model architecture. The model consists of three modules that
reproduce specific properties of neurons in the visual pathway and in
parietal and premotor cortex. a Shape recognition pathway, mimick-
ing the properties of neurons in primary visual cortex, area V4, and of
shape and higher-level form and motion-selective areas, which
recognize the shapes of goal object and the moving hand. b Module
that computes information about the relationship between the hand
and the goal object. The relative position map encode the relative
position of the hand relative to the goal object, and permits to
compute the relative speed between them based on local motion
detectors. c Module containing neurons with selectivity for goal-
directed movements. The action state neurons represent individual
time phases of the action and link the information about the type of
the hand movement, and about the spatial relationship and the relative
speed of hand and object. Action neurons represent the type of the
perceived action, integrating the activity over the whole time course.
Their activity was compared to the obtained psychophysical data
482 Psychological Research (2012) 76:476–493
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supposed to recognize). An overview of the key properties
of the model neurons along the visual recognition hierarchy
is given in Table 1. Further details can be found in Flei-
scher et al. (2009).
The form recognition pathway deviates from established
object recognition models with respect to two properties:
First, even at the highest level of the hierarchy the neural
detectors are not completely position-invariant, as is the
case in many other models for object recognition. Instead,
they have receptive fields with a corresponding diameter of
about 4, compatible with electrophysiological data from
area IT in the monkey (Op De Beeck & Vogels, 2000; Di
Carlo & Maunsell, 2003). This allows to estimate the ret-
inal positions of the goal object and the hand from the
highest level of the recognition hierarchy. Second, the
detectors for the hand shape are embedded in a recurrent
neural network which makes the activity in the network
dependent on the temporal order of the individual hand
shapes in the stimulus movies. Following earlier work on
motion recognition (Giese & Poggio, 2003), we modeled
temporal order selectivity by introducing asymmetric lat-
eral couplings between the hand shape-selective neurons
(see inset in Fig. 4a). The outputs of the sequence-selective
hand shape detectors are further analyzed in two different
ways: First, they feed into the second module B) supporting
the estimation of the retinal position of the hand. Second,
the responses of all hand shape neurons that are selective
for hand postures belonging to the same type of hand
movement are summed up by motion pattern neurons.
These neurons encode types of hand movements such as
grasping or pushing, independent of the goal object.
The second module of the model (Fig. 4b), the affor-
dance module, recombines the following types of infor-
mation about object and effector: (1) It determines the
matching of the shapes of the goal object and the hand, (2)
it computes their relative position and (3) their relative
speeds (distinguishing approaching, moving apart, moving
together). The core component of this module is a relative
position map that represents the retinal position of the hand
relative to the object as an activation peak in a two-
dimensional neural activity map. This map is computed by
a gain field mechanism (Salinas & Abbott, 1995; Pouget &
Sejnowski, 1997). This is a feed-forward network that
combines the outputs of shape-selective neurons form
module (A) in a multiplicative manner. (See Fleischer et al.
(2009) for further details). One can learn a region in this
relative position map that corresponds to hand positions
relative to the object that would arise during successful
grips. We assume the existence of affordance neurons that
sum the activity in the relative position map within this
region. These neurons are activated only by spatial hand–
object configurations that are typical for successful actions.
The second useful information that can be extracted from
the relative position map by simple neural mechanisms is
the relative speed of hand and object, which corresponds to
the speed of the activity peak in the map. Direction and
speed of this peak are detected by relative speed neurons,
which are modeled as simple correlative motion detectors
(motion energy detectors), as extensively discussed as
models for direction selective neurons in primary visual
cortex (for review see Smith & Snowden, 1994). Finally,
the output signals of subsets of the relative speed neurons
are pooled by relative motion neurons. These neurons
signal characteristic types of relative motion that are rele-
vant for the analysis of goal-directed actions: approaching
of hand and object, moving apart, or moving together. For
example, the neuron detecting approaching pools the out-
puts of all relative motion neurons signaling motion of the
hand toward the goal object, independent of the global
motion direction or exact speed. In a similar way, detectors
Table 1 Most important
parameters of the model
(alternative numbers indicate
neurons selective for grasping
vs. pushing)
For further details see Fleischer
et al. (2009)
Type of feature detector Number of detectors Receptive field size
Shape recognition hierarchy
Simple cells [3 millions 0.35–0.99
Complex cells *100,000 0.49–1.38
Fragment detectors [1.2 millions 1.5–4.2
Shape detectors 5,500 4.5
Affordance computation
Relative position map *15,000
Affordance neurons 50 *4 (RPM)
Relative speed neurons 140.000 5–10
Relative motion neurons 3 [10
Action-selective neurons
Action state neurons 17/30 [10
Action neurons 2 [10
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for the other motion events can be constructed. Similar
circuits for the detection of complex motion patterns have
been proposed as models for neurons in area MST (Ko-
enderink, van Doorn, & van de Grind, 1985; Beardsley &
Vaina, 2001). One class of relative motion detects essen-
tially the absence of relative motion (moving together).
The third module (Fig. 4c) contains model neurons with
selectivity for goal-directed actions. These neurons com-
bine the following information provided by the earlier
modules: (1) Type of the hand action (grasping or pushing),
as signaled by the motion pattern neurons; (2) matching of
hand and object shape and their relative position, as sig-
naled by the affordance neurons; (3) type of relative motion
between hand and object, as signaled by the relative motion
neurons. These different inputs are combined by action
state neurons, which are again modeled by radial basis
function units that are trained in a supervised manner from
example actions. These units respond maximally during
particular phases of individual goal-directed actions (e.g.
the hand approaching the object or the object moving away
after contact with the hand). Such behavior is typical for
higher action-selective neurons, e.g. in the superior tem-
poral, parietal or premotor cortex. Finally, the highest level
of our model is given by action neurons that sum the
activity of the different action state neurons belonging to
the same action type. These neurons signal the presence of
particular actions independent of particular phases in time.
The activities of these neurons were compared to the
psychophysical results.
Simulation procedure
For a fair comparison of the model performance to the
experiment, we fitted the response obtained at the level of
the action neurons to the average experimental results. In
order to simplify a quantitative comparison between the
human ratings and the simulation results from the model,
the model responses for the original, non-manipulated
action stimuli of grasping and pushing were rescaled to
match to the corresponding average causality ratings in the
experiment. All other model responses for grasping and
pushing stimuli were re-scaled by the same factor accord-
ingly. Furthermore, we fitted the tuning parameters of the
action state neurons, adjusting the tuning width parameters
separately for the radial basis function inputs from the af-
fordance neurons and the relative speed neurons.
A key assumption underlying our simulations was that
the main difference between the processing of realistic and
abstract action stimuli is the accuracy of the form tuning in
the processing hierarchy. After training of the system with
the naturalistic stimuli, for the processing of the abstract
stimuli we reduced the accuracy of the form recognition
hierarchy by lowering the firing thresholds of the neurons
at the level of the shape detectors. This led to a strongly
reduced selectivity of the shape detectors which then
responded also to arbitrary shapes, such as the discs. As a
result, detectors for object shape as well as for hand shapes
were equally activated at the location of the two discs.
In situations where the two blobs overlapped within the
receptive fields of the neurons computing the relative
position map, the leftmost activity maximum was assigned
to the hand and the rightmost to the object. This disam-
biguation seemed justified given that in the real experiment
the blobs had different colors, and since participants were
explicitly told which disc represented the hand and the
object. As result, hand and object detectors were activated
by artificial stimuli at very similar locations as for natu-
ralistic grasping and pushing stimuli.
In addition, we increased the width of the Gaussian
tuning functions of the action state neurons for the artificial
stimuli in order to decrease their pattern selectivity in a
similar way as for the shape detectors. Responses of the
action state neurons for abstract disc stimuli were thus
solely dependent on the patterns of relative position and
motion. Gradual modulations of tuning properties of cor-
tical neurons have been observed, e.g. in the context of
attentional modulation (e.g. Treue, 2001; Deco & Rolls,
2005), and it seems plausible that the cortex might be able
to modulate such properties in a task-dependent manner.
Results
In the following, we first present the psychophysical results
comparing naturalistic and abstract stimuli in terms of the
naturalness ratings (i.e. the similarity of the stimuli with
natural hand actions) and the causality ratings. We then
show that the neural model is able to reproduce the
observed dependencies on the stimulus parameters.
Ratings for the non-manipulated movements
Figure 5 shows the normalized average ratings of natural-
ness and causality for the original, unmanipulated grasping
and pushing actions as well as the corresponding abstract
stimuli (cf. Fig. 1). Normalization was necessary in order
to make the ratings of different observers more comparable
since not all participants used the full range of available
ratings. Naturalness and causality ratings were normalized
independently for each participant by transforming the
range of ratings linearly so that the minimum was 0 and the
maximum 1.
All ratings of naturalness and causality for both stimulus
types and both actions were consistently high and signifi-
cantly above the midpoint (0.5) of the normalized rating
scale (Wilcoxon signed rank test, all p \ 0.001). This
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indicates that all stimuli were rated as quite similar to
normally occurring hand object interactions. This likely
makes them efficient as stimuli that induce the impression
of causality in the sense of Michotte.
To test for differences between the stimuli types and
actions, we conducted two-factor repeated measures
ANOVAs, separately for the two variables naturalness and
causality with the factors Stimulus type (naturalistic vs.
abstract) and Action type (grasping vs. pushing). The
ANOVA for the naturalness ratings revealed no significant
main effect for the stimulus type [F(1, 17) = 1.928,
p = 0.183] but a trend toward significance for the factor
Action type [F(1, 17) = 3.392, p = 0.083]. This reflects
the higher naturalness ratings for naturalistic grasping than
for pushing movements, potentially caused by differences
in the familiarity of the two types of actions. The interac-
tion between both factors was not significant [F(1,
17) = 1.845, p = 0.192].
The corresponding ANOVA for the causality ratings
revealed no significant main effects, but a significant
interaction between Stimulus and Action type [F(1,
17) = 8.858, p = 0.008]. This is consistent with the result
from post hoc testing by comparing natural and abstract
stimuli for the individual actions, which revealed signifi-
cantly higher causality ratings for naturalistic than for
abstract grasping stimuli (Wilcoxon signed rank test,
p = 0.005), while the same test for the pushing actions
failed to show significant differences.
In summary, these results show high naturalness and
causality ratings in the range of 0.75–1, with a slight ten-
dency of artificial stimuli being perceived as less natural
than the naturalistic hand action stimuli for grasping
stimuli. Especially the ratings for pushing actions failed to
show significant differences between abstract and natural
stimuli, potentially indicating a higher influence of detailed
form cues in the processing of grasping actions.
Ratings for the manipulated movements
To further analyze the similarity between the two stimulus
classes, novel stimuli were generated that included spatial
and temporal manipulations that were known to affect the
perception of causality according to the classical literature.
The first manipulation was the Shift condition, where the
hand was translated horizontally within the image plain
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against the ball, creating a spatial gap between effector and
object. Figure 6a shows the naturalness and Fig. 7 (panel a
for grasping, b for pushing actions) the causality ratings for
different spatial displacements. For both the naturalistic
and abstract stimuli, the average ratings of naturalness and
causality were dependent on the size of the displacement.
All ratings show similar trends and decay quickly for
increasing shift sizes and particularly fast and to a larger
degree for the naturalistic stimuli than for the abstract ones.
However, some quantitative differences exist in terms of
the exact shapes of the decay.
This qualitative observation is confirmed by a dependent
measures ANOVAs with the three factors Shift size,
Stimulus type (naturalistic vs. artificial), and Action type
(grasping vs. pushing). For the naturalness ratings, the
main effect of Shift size is highly significant [F(1.72,
29.247) = 68.55, p \ 0.001 with Greenhouse–Geisser
correction]. In addition, the naturalness rating for natural-
istic grasping movements compared to abstract stimuli, and
compared to pushing actions, drops abruptly even for very
small spatial deviations (50 pixel, see Fig. 6a). This results
in highly significant two-way interactions between Shift
size and Stimulus type [F(5, 85) = 6.05, p \ 0.001], and
between Stimulus type and Action type [F(1, 17) = 17.51,
p = 0.001], as well as in a significant three-way interaction
[F(5, 85) = 14.189, p \ 0.001]. For the causality ratings,
only the main effect of Shift size [F(2.2, 36.6) = 23.401,
p \ 0.001, Greenhouse–Geisser corrected] and the three-
way interaction, observable as a shallower decay of the
causality ratings for the abstract grasping stimuli compared
to the other conditions in Fig. 7a, b, were statistically
significant [F(3.1, 53.4) = 3.12, p = 0.03, Greenhouse–
Geisser corrected].
In contrast to the result patterns for grasping actions, for
stimuli depicting pushing movements both ratings—for
naturalistic and for abstract stimuli—show a highly com-
parable curve progression and no main effect for the
Stimulus type was found. The observed interactions are
consistent with the fact that the ratings for naturalistic
stimuli decay somewhat faster with the shift size, poten-
tially reflecting increased sensitivity for small spatial
mismatches between hand shape and object for the natu-
ralistic stimuli.
The second manipulation was the variation of the
Contact point, rotating the hand position about the ball.
The rating results from this condition are shown in Figs. 6b
and 7 (panels c for grasping and d for pushing actions) for
different rotation angles. Both the naturalness and the
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causality rating peak at very similar values for both stim-
ulus types (naturalistic and abstract) without manipulation
(rotation angle zero). Both measures decay monotonically
for increasing deviations of the rotation angle from zero,
resulting in increasing deviations from the normal contact
points of the fingers with the object (respectively of the
corresponding discs). The resulting ‘tuning curves’ are
clearly wider for the abstract than for the naturalistic
stimuli. This is even more evident for grasping actions
where the curves for abstract stimuli are nearly flat lines
(solid dark lines in Figs. 6b, 7c). This coincides with the
observation that even relatively small deviations of the
contact points of the fingers with the object from the nor-
mal ones makes this stimulus look rather unnatural while
the perception of abstract forms is less affected by small
deviations. For pushing actions, the manipulation of the
Contact point resulted in a shallower decay of the partici-
pants’ ratings, thus exact finger configuration with respect
to the object was less critical for the perception of an
natural scene depicting a causal interaction.
These qualitative observations are confirmed by a statis-
tical analysis, again performing a three-factor ANOVA with
the factors Rotation angle, Stimulus type, and Action type.
For the naturalness ratings, we observed significant main
effects for the Rotation angle [F(2.7, 46.7) = 54.642,
p \ 0.001 with Greenhouse–Geisser correction] as well as
for Stimulus type (naturalistic vs. artificial) [F(1,
17) = 41.2, p \ 0.001], but not for the Action type. All two-
way interactions are significant (Rotation angle 9 Stimulus
type: F(2.1, 36.3) = 13.66, p \ 0.001 with Greenhouse–
Geisser correction; Rotation angle 9 Action type: F(4,
14) = 6.07, p \ 0.001) and Stimulus 9 Action type: F(1,
17) = 63.0, p \ 0.001 and also the three-way interaction
[F(4, 68) = 12.95, p \ 0.001]. Results were similar for the
causality ratings with significant main effects for the Rota-
tion angle and the Stimulus type [F(2.6, 44.1) = 17.98,
p \ 0.001 Greenhouse–Geissser corrected, respectively,
F(1, 17) = 6.811, p \ 0.02], but not the Action type. All
two-way interactions were significant (Rotation angle 9
Stimulus type: F(2.2, 38) = 4.40, p = 0.016; Rotation
angle 9 Action type: F(3.7, 59.1) = 3.21, p \ 0.04, both
Greenhouse–Geisser corrected; Stimulus 9 Action type:
F(1, 17) = 7.1, p \ 0.01) and also the three-way interaction
[F(4, 68) = 7, p \ 0.001]. The reduced width of the
observed ‘tuning curve’ for the abstract stimuli may be
interpreted as indication that such stimuli are processed with
less accurate form tuning.
Our third manipulation was the Pause condition, where
the frame of the first hand–object contact was repeated for
time intervals with variable durations. The rating results
from this condition are shown in Figs. 6c and 8 (grasping:
panel a, pushing: panel b) for different durations of the
pause. Notably, this manipulation resulted in the most
obvious differences between grasping and pushing actions.
While for grasping actions—independent of the Stimulus
type—the length of the Pause at the contact point seems to
have nearly no influence on the judgments of naturalness
and causality (Figs. 6c, 8a), both ratings decay quickly for
the pushing actions (Figs. 6c, 8b), again showing qualita-
tively very similar trends.
For more detailed quantitative analysis, we performed an
independent-measures ANOVA with the three factors
Duration, Stimulus type (naturalistic vs. artificial) and
Action type (grasping vs. pushing). For the naturalness rat-
ings, the main effect of the Duration is highly significant
[F(2.2, 37.3) = 14.70, p \ 0.001 with Greenhouse–Geisser
correction], although mainly driven by the pushing actions.
In addition, the main effect of the Action type [F(1, 17) =
36.28, p \ 0.001] and the two-way interaction between the
last two factors are significant [F(4, 68) = 12.20,
p \ 0.001]. A similar picture arises for the causality ratings:
The main effects of Duration and Action type are significant
[F(2.94, 50.1) = 16.17, p \ 0.001, Greenhouse–Geisser
corrected, respectively, F(1, 17) = 15.16, p = 0.001]. So
are also the two-way interactions between Duration and
Action type [F(3.1, 52.7) = 15.28, p \ 0.001 with Green-
house–Geisser correction] and between Action type and
Stimulus type [F(1, 17) = 11.13, p = 0.004]. All other
effects were non-significant (p [ 0.05). The lack of a main
effect of Stimulus type is consistent with the similarity of the
trends for the pushing stimuli. However, there is a difference
between the ratings for the grasping stimuli that likely is
responsible for the observed interaction effect.
The interactions with the factor Action type are consistent
with the fundamentally different behavior for grasping and
pushing stimuli. The ratings for the two actions are presented
separately in Figs. 6c and 8a, b. The Pause manipulation
basically did not affect the ratings for grasping, while it had a
strong influence on the ratings for pushing. Again ratings are
similar for the two stimulus types. Two separate ANOVAs
for the grasping and the pushing stimuli confirmed this
observation. For grasping, we found significant main effects
of Stimulus type for the naturalness as well as for the cau-
sality ratings [F(1, 17) = 6.88, p = 0.018, respectively, F(1,
17) = 4.963, p = 0.04]. In addition, we found a significant
interaction between Stimulus type and Duration for the
causality ratings only F(4, 68) = 3.20, p = 0.018]. For
pushing, however, we found only a significant main effect for
the Delay [F(2.2, 37.3) = 15.54, p \ 0.001, respectively,
F(2.3, 39.1) = 19.6, p \ 0.001, Greenhouse–Geisser cor-
rected]. The fact that the introduction of a pause did not affect
naturalness and causality ratings for grasping seems plausi-
ble, since grasping with holding on the object for a while
before lifting it is a valid and naturally occurring action,
which, however, implies that the hand causes the movement
of the ball.
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The last manipulation tested was the Time gap condi-
tion, where a time delay was introduced between the
movement of the object and the movement of the hand. The
rating results from this condition are shown in Figs. 6d and
8 (grasping: panel c, pushing: panel d) for different dura-
tions of the delay. Both ratings decay with the duration of
the delay and show qualitatively very similar differences
between the two stimulus classes.
For a more detailed analysis, we performed an indepen-
dent-measures ANOVA with the three factors Duration,
Stimulus type (naturalistic vs. artificial) and Action type
(grasping vs. pushing). For the naturalness ratings, the main
effects of the Duration are highly significant [F(1.6,
25.592) = 40.99, p \ 0.001 with Greenhouse–Geisser cor-
rection), and also the main effect of the Action type [F(1,
16) = 21.83, p \ 0.001]. In addition, the two-way interac-
tion between these two factors and between Duration and
Stimulus type are significant [F(3.3, 52.6) = 16.24,
p \ 0.001 Greenhouse–Geisser corrected, respectively, F(5,
12) = 3.8, p = 0.004). Similar results were obtained for the
causality ratings with significant main effects of Duration
and Action type [F(1.9, 30.68) = 43.11, p \ 0.001 Green-
house–Geisser corrected, respectively, F(1, 16) = 10.66,
p = 0.005] and significant two-way interactions between
Duration and Action type [F(5, 80) = 3.19, p = 0.01] and
Duration and Stimulus type [F(5, 80) = 2.531, p = 0.035].
The interactions result from the fact that the ratings for
grasping decay faster compared to the ratings for pushing
(Fig. 8c, d).
Summarizing, we found qualitatively quite similar
trends for the two stimulus classes (naturalistic and
abstract) for the tested stimulus manipulations. However, a
detailed quantitative analysis revealed also some differ-
ences, especially in conditions where the exact localization
of the fingers might be critical for the detection of suc-
cessful grasping. In addition, for grasping the introduction
of a pause interval at the frame of object contact did not
have a substantial influence on naturalness and causality
perception, opposed to the same manipulation applied to
pushing stimuli.
Simulation results from the model
The simulation results of the model (Fig. 4) compared to
the causality ratings of the human participants are shown in
Fig. 7 for the spatial, and in Fig. 8 for the temporal
manipulations. The panels show the normalized activity of
the action neurons at the highest level of the model hier-
archy (cf. Fig. 4c), averaged over time.
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Fig. 8 Causality ratings and simulation results for temporal manip-
ulations. Left panels Results comparing naturalistic and abstract
stimuli of grasping actions (filled circles and solid lines) and pushing
movements (opened circles and dashed lines). Error bars indicate
standard errors (N = 18). Right panels Normalized activation of the
action neurons in the model, summed over time. a Causality ratings
for grasping movements in the Pause manipulation, where the contact
frame was repeated for different time intervals and corresponding
activity of the action neurons. b Corresponding results for the pushing
action. c Causality ratings for different levels of the Time gap
manipulation and the related normalized responses of the model for
grasping actions. d Results for the pushing actions in the Time gap
manipulation
b
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A comparison of model responses for the naturalistic
stimuli with the human ratings for causality shows a close
qualitative matching of the trends in dependence of the
manipulation strength for grasping and pushing actions,
with a very small number of exceptions. This good quali-
tative agreement is also supported by highly significant
correlations (Table 2) between the model neurons’ activi-
ties and the causality ratings in most cases, except for the
ones where also the human data did not show significant
variations with the manipulation strength (Contact point
manipulation for abstract grasping stimuli, and Shift
manipulation in grasping stimuli; indicated by diamonds in
Table 2).
For the Contact point manipulation, the causality ratings
for abstract grasping do not vary with the rotation angle,
while they do so for the pushing action. This likely reflects
the fact that a matching of the correct finger positions in
grasping requires detailed shape information, which is not
present in the abstract stimuli. Contrasting with the
grasping stimuli, pushing stimuli result in less occlusions
of the object by the hand, so that the detection of the
correct contact points can still partially be accomplished
based on relative position information. The model nicely
reproduces this difference between the two stimulus
classes.
For the Pause manipulation and grasping (naturalistic
and abstract stimuli), the human ratings do not vary sig-
nificantly with the pause duration while this is the case for
pushing. Also this trend is reproduced by the model.
Like in the human data, the model shows often quite
similar behavior for abstract and naturalistic stimuli. Also
it reproduces many details of the patterns of human ratings.
For most manipulations, the simulations reproduce accu-
rately the decaying trends with the size of the manipula-
tion, resulting in highly significant correlations between the
human ratings and the activity of the action neurons. In
many cases, the simulations reproduce also quite accurately
the differences between the widths of the tuning curves for
the Contact point manipulation between naturalistic and
abstract stimuli.
Interestingly, even the fundamental difference in the
trends between grasping and pushing actions for the time
manipulations (cf. Fig. 7b, c) is qualitatively reproduced:
The dependence of the activity on the pause duration for
grasping is rather flat while the curve for pushing decays.
In the model, this fundamentally different behavior emer-
ges because the frozen frame of the grasping sequence
activates adequately one of the action state neurons, which
encodes the contact together with zero relative motion. For
pushing, however, the contact frame is associated with
non-zero relative motion between hand and object (first the
hand approaches the resting object, then the object moves
away from the resting hand). This implies that for this
stimulus, the replication of the contact frame results in an
inadequate stimulus for the action state neurons, resulting
in the observed decay of the activity with increasing
duration of the delay.
The reproduction of the data at this level of detail seems
quite astonishing, given that the model was originally
developed for the processing of naturalistic action stimuli,
and that no extra mechanisms were added for the pro-
cessing of the abstract stimuli, except for a variation of the
accuracy of the tuning.
Discussion
The recognition of actions of others requires the prediction
of action consequences and goals, and classical experi-
ments have demonstrated that humans can generate such
predictions robustly even from highly abstract stimuli, such
as moving rigid geometrical shapes. This paper proposes a
new neural theory for the perception of such abstract
motion stimuli and the perception of causality assuming
Table 2 Comparisons between model predictions and human ratings
Shift Contact point Pause Time gap
PCC p PCC p PCC p PCC p
Naturalistic
Grasping 0.90 0.013 0.86 0.060 0.26 0.55 r 0.95 0.004
Pushing 0.94 0.005 0.97 0.006 0.98 0.003 0.98 \0.001
Abstract
Grasping 0.93 0.008 -0.522 0.367 r 0 1 r 0.96 0.003
Pushing 0.71 0.11 0.95 0.013 0.94 0.019 0.99 \0.001
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (PCC) and corresponding p values for the correlations between human ratings and the activity of
the corresponding action neurons at the highest level of the model. Data is shown for the different stimulus types, action types, and manipu-
lations. Diamonds (r) indicate manipulations that did not significantly alter the human ratings of causality, resulting in flat curves in Figs. 7
and 8
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physiologically plausible simple neural mechanisms.
Consistent with previous work in functional imaging
(Castelli et al., 2000; Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Fonlupt,
2003; Martin & Weisberg, 2003; Ohnishi et al., 2004;
Schultz et al., 2004; Schubotz & von Cramon, 2004;
Fugelsang et al., 2005; Reithler et al., 2007), we hypoth-
esized that the perception of abstract action stimuli might
be explained by the same neural mechanisms as the per-
ception of naturalistic goal-directed movements, such as
object-directed hand actions. Going substantially beyond
this previous work, our model proposes concrete neural
circuits that are computationally sufficient for the pro-
cessing of real action stimuli and which reproduce suc-
cessfully, at least qualitatively, fundamental trends
observed in psychophysical experiments on perceptual
causality.
We provided two pieces of evidence in support of the
hypothesis that real and abstract action stimuli might be
processed by similar neural mechanisms. First, we com-
pared the perception of naturalness and causality induced
by naturalistic video stimuli showing grasping and pushing
with the perception of the same measures from abstract
motion stimuli, which consisted of two moving discs
whose spatio-temporal parameters were exactly matched
with the naturalistic stimuli. For both stimulus classes, we
found qualitatively very similar dependences on specific
spatio-temporal manipulations that were known from pre-
vious work (Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000) to affect the per-
ception of causality. Apart from very similar trends in the
parametric dependencies, we observed that the perception
of naturalistic stimuli was more sensitive to spatial
manipulations. This suggests that more fine-grained shape
processing might play a critical role for the visual analysis
of such stimuli, e.g. in order to verify the correct contact
points of the fingers. As a second piece of evidence for our
hypothesis we presented a physiologically inspired model
for the recognition of goal-directed hand actions that
reproduces correctly the basic parametric dependencies
observed in our psychophysical experiments, at least
qualitatively. The only change compared to the original
version of the model that was optimized for hand action
recognition from real videos was that we reduced the
accuracy of the form tuning at several levels of the model.
Such dynamic modulations of tuning properties have been
shown to be present in visual cortex at earlier levels, e.g. in
the context of attentional modulation (e.g. Treue &
Maunsell, 2006). The original model, at the same time
reproduces a variety of results about the behavior of action-
selective single cells in monkey cortex and has thus a direct
link to detailed mechanisms in the cortex (Fleischer &
Giese, 2010). Given that this model was developed and
optimized for the processing of naturalistic stimuli, we
think that the observed generalization to abstract stimuli
and the reproduction of parametric dependencies for this
stimulus class is non-trivial and not necessarily expected.
Clearly the evidence provided is not sufficient as a
complete proof of our hypothesis. For example, one might
argue that there are many potential alternative mechanisms
for the processing of causality, which operate in parallel to
visual action processing and which work equally efficient
for naturalistic and artificial stimuli. In addition, it seems
likely that there are higher-level cognitive mechanisms,
e.g. involving reasoning processes or inference about social
intentions, which might be required to account for the
attribution of more complex forms of causality (e.g. Rips,
2011; Baker et al., 2009). However, our theoretical model
shows that plausible neural mechanisms for the visual
processing of actions produce signatures very similar to the
ones discussed in classical studies on perceptual causality.
In this sense, our model provides sufficient explanation for
some of the observed phenomena, but clearly lacks the
proof of necessity. To our knowledge, there is so far no
other work that gives an explicit implementation of
mechanisms for the perception of abstract motion and
causality that are applicable to real image sequences, nor
are there any models that link such phenomena directly to
the behavior of individual cortical neurons. Knowing that
the model includes many strong simplifications and has
serious shortcomings (such as the complete lack of top-
down feedback, disparity cues, etc.), we think that it might
be useful for experimentalists since it specifies exact
computational mechanisms at a level that makes specific
predictions at the level of individual neurons. This distin-
guishes the proposed model from a variety of more abstract
models on causality perception in the literature (Blythe
et al., 1999; Rips, 2011). One of the most prominent pre-
dictions that follows from our theory is directly testable in
physiological experiments: action-selective neurons at
higher cortical levels, such as the parietal or the premotor
cortex should show substantial generalization from natu-
ralistic goal-directed action stimuli to abstract motion
stimuli of the type discussed in this paper. Interestingly,
this prediction could be recently confirmed in an electro-
physiological experiment in monkeys assessing the
responses of mirror neurons in premotor area F5 using the
same type of stimuli as in this study (Pomper et al.,
Abstracts of the Society for Neuroscience, 914.02, 2011).
Finally, one might consider what the proposed theory
might be able to contribute to central topics that are fre-
quently discussed with respect to the perception of abstract
motion and causality. One frequently discussed point is
whether causality perception is based on innate mecha-
nisms (Michotte 1946/1963; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000;
Schlottmann et al., 2006; Rips, 2011). While this question
needs to be addressed thoroughly using methods from
developmental psychology and potentially genetics, our
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computational model shows that in presence of an appro-
priate hierarchical architecture, relatively elementary
learning-based neural mechanisms are computationally
sufficient to account for some of the observed phenomena
in the context of the perception of causality. However, it
seems likely that the basic structure of the underlying
neural processing architecture is largely innate. A second
issue is whether the perception of causality is a purely
perceptual, or a higher cognitive phenomenon (Rips, 2011).
In our model, the neurons reflecting the perception of
causality emerge at the highest level (Fig. 4c) of the pro-
cessing hierarchy, corresponding to parietal and premotor
levels of action processing. It is known that these levels of
visual representations are linked to structures in the basal
ganglia and the limbic system, e.g. the amygdala, known to
be involved in processing non-visual aspects of causal
interactions (e.g. Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010; Straube &
Chatterjee, 2010). In addition in some of these higher
cortical regions, visual and motor representations of actions
clearly overlap at the level of individual neurons (e.g.
Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001; Fogassi et al., 2005;
Prinz, 1997). Such overlap might indicate a representation
of actions at a relatively abstract level useful for the pro-
gramming and control of reactive or interactive motor
behavior. From a philosophical point of view, it seems to
be a complex question to decide whether such high-level
representations should be termed visual, motor, or
cognitive.
Finally, it has to be mentioned that the present model
addresses causal interactions only in a limited way,
focusing on what has been called ‘physical causality’ (e.g.
Schlottmann et al., 2006). We have not tested so far
whether the same type of model can also be extended for
the treatment of ‘social causality’, as studied in the clas-
sical displays by Heider and Simmel (1944) or Kanizsa and
Vicario (1968). In this case, the interaction of the two
abstract objects is interpreted in terms of psychological
rather than of physical terms (for example as one disc
‘chasing’ another). Since the model structure that we pro-
pose has been originally derived from a neural model that
accounts for the perception of biological motion (Giese &
Poggio, 2003) it has most ingredients for the recognition of
movements of biological agents. ‘Intentional’ interactions
would be characterized by the fact that the behavior of one
agent specifies the goals for the other. The recognition of
such interactive behavior seems again to essentially depend
on the processing of the relationship between multiple
agents, as accomplished by the neural circuitry illustrated
in Fig. 4b. However, the technical details of such a rec-
ognition circuit would have to be worked out and the solid
testing of these ideas, using real-world and abstract inter-
active stimuli, defines an interesting topic for future
research.
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